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1. Introduction
In the past few decades, a feature of the education systems of a number of countries has been the 
introduction of school reforms operating through the creation of new school types. The best 
known examples of these are the free schools (“friskolor”) of Sweden, the charter schools in the 
United States and the academy schools of England. These new school types have mostly been 
introduced with the justification that the pre-existing education system was not delivering high 
enough standards for children. Whilst there are notable differences between them (in particular 
whether they are brand new schools or conversions from existing schools), they all represent 
movements away from what can be thought of as the traditional, state controlled, local or 
community school. More specifically, these new schools are typically decentralised from local 
authority/municipality/school district control, and thus have more operational autonomy. 
This paper focuses on the academy schools of England. The introduction of academies, 
which began in the early 2000s, is turning out to be one of the most radical and encompassing 
programmes of school reform seen in the recent past amongst advanced countries. Unlike 
traditional community schools, academies are autonomous, state-funded schools which are 
managed and run outside of local authority control. In almost all cases, they are conversions of 
already existing predecessor schools that inherit pupils already enrolled in the school. In 
essence, academies are school ‘takeovers’ which, because of their nature, enable schools to 
operate with considerably more autonomy and strategic independence than they did in their 
predecessor state.1 
At present, around 2000 of England's secondary schools (or about 63 percent of schools) 
and a further 2300 (about 15 percent) of primary schools have become academies.2 Whilst the 
first academies were introduced in the 2002/03 school year by the Labour Government in power 
at the time, the vast majority became academies after the change of government in May 2010. 
The newly elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition quickly ushered in the 2010 
Academies Act, a legislative change that widened the academies’ remit. Prior to the Act, only 
secondary schools could become academies, and in order to convert they were required to sign 
up a sponsor. After the Academies Act, there was more heterogeneity as primaries were also 
1
 They are therefore different from most US charter schools which are typically, though not always, set up from 
scratch. A closer comparison to the typical charter school in England would be the free schools which are a recent 
addition to the education landscape. These are new schools often set up by parent or community groups. 
Conversely, the closer US comparison to English academies would be ‘in-district’ charters where an already 
existing public school is converted to a charter as a school takeover. Although these are less commonplace than US 
charters as a whole, there are places where conversions of public schools to charters have taken place (like Boston 
and New Orleans – see Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014). 
2
 In England, secondary schooling takes place from ages 11-12 to 15-16 (years 7 to 11) and primary from ages 4-5 
to 10-11 (years 1 to 6). 
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allowed to become academies, free schools were introduced, and a sponsor was no longer 
required for conversion to take place. 
In fact,  the introduction of the act dramatically changed the aim of the programme. While 
the Labour Government introduced academies as a remedial programme aimed at replacing 
failing schools, the Coalition Government expanded the programme as part of a project aimed at 
introducing greater autonomy and competition into the state school sector. While new Labour-
type ‘sponsored’ academies have continued to open, most of the expansion of the academy 
sector has come from ‘converter’ high-performing schools which mainly change their 
institutional arrangements to acquire more autonomy in terms of budgeting, hiring of staff, pay 
and working condition negotiations, performance management, taught curriculum, and length of 
the school day. To put things in perspective, ‘converters’ represent almost 80% of the expansion 
of the academy sector in the past five years.  
This aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the two programmes. Understanding 
similarities and differences between them is important from both an academic research and a 
public policy perspective. One reason why this investigation is needed is the continued 
extrapolation of findings from the first programme to the post-May 2010 conversions, by 
policymakers, media commentators and – in some cases – academics. The extent to which this 
extrapolation is valid depends on the extent to which the two programmes are alike.  
To uncover similarities and differences between the two regimes, we undertake an 
empirical study of all academy conversions that took place between the academic years 
2002/2003 and 2012/2013, with two particular policy relevant research questions in mind. 
Firstly, we study the characteristics of schools that convert to an academy. It is well documented 
that the pre-2010 conversions were under-achieving schools usually serving urban inner-city 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The general perception – as well as the nature of the Coalition 
Government academy programme – suggests that this is not true for the new batch of academies. 
In this paper, we present direct empirical evidence of the differences between the two 
programmes.  
The second research focus of interest is on whether academy conversion impacts 
differentially on the quality of new pupil enrolments into the school. Earlier evidence (Eyles and 
Machin, 2015; Machin and Vernoit, 2011; Machin and Wilson, 2008; Wilson, 2011) suggests 
that the Labour academies enrol pupils with higher end of primary school test scores and other 
advantageous background characteristics (e.g. fewer pupils eligible for free meals) post-
conversion. We therefore consider how similar or different this trend has been for the pre- and 
post-May 2010 academy schools. 
3 
To preview our findings, we do find that the programmes are significantly different in 
terms of the characteristics of the schools converting and in terms of the quality of new 
enrolments to the school. This clearly shows that the programmes are not prima facie 
comparable; therefore, findings from the earlier conversions cannot be meaningfully 
extrapolated to later conversions. That said, we also highlight some commonalities suggesting 
that a more careful and nuanced comparison could in some circumstances be undertaken. We 
discuss this later in more detail, but one clear instance is that a comparison of Labour-type 
‘sponsored’ academies in both regimes may be a legitimate comparison to draw. Conversely, 
any extrapolation from ‘sponsored’ academies to Coalition ‘converters’ would be a distorted 
comparison likely to lead to biased conclusions. 
Our evidence contributes to a small but growing literature on the nature and effects of 
academy schools. The first round of studies focussed on a small number of early Labour 
academies and investigated the effect of conversion on pupil achievement at the end of 
secondary schooling (see Machin and Wilson, 2008; Machin and Vernoit, 2011; Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2008; and National Audit Office, 2010). More recently, Eyles and Machin 
(2015) conducted a comprehensive causal evaluation of the Labour academies programme 
studying both intake and performance effects. The authors found significant changes in the 
ability composition of pupils enrolling at academies after conversion. This result echoes the 
findings of Wilson (2011). The authors also found significant academy effects on school 
performance even after accounting for compositional changes. However, no empirical 
investigation has been undertaken to quantitatively assess the (dis)similarities between the 
Labour and Coalition Government academies. Our study fills this gap. 
Our work also contributes to the literature on the effect of different school types on pupil 
enrolment and performance. While research on the impact of attending different types of schools 
is extensive (Neal, 1997; Gibbons and Silva, 2011), there is much less evidence on what 
happens when the type of school attended by pupils changes. One study closely related to this 
paper, albeit from an earlier time period, is the analysis of grant-maintained (GM) schools by 
Clark (2009) in England in the late 1980s-early 1990s.3 Clark documented significant test score 
improvements, but provided limited evidence on changes in pupil intake.  
In the US the growing body of work on charter schools is clearly related to our work 
because charters have similarities to academies – even though most charters are new schools 
while academies are not (see Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2011; Hoxby and Murarka, 2009; Angrist et 
al, 2010; and Dobbie and Fryer, 2011). A smaller number of studies have focused on the less 
frequently observed event of conversions of already existing schools to charters 
3
 GM schools were renamed as foundation schools in the Schools Act 1998. 
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(Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014), or the introduction of practices used in charters to US public 
schools (Fryer, 2014). Most of these studies analysed the causal effect of charter attendance on 
students’ performance by exploiting the use of lotteries by oversubscribed schools; therefore, 
they cannot provide (by construction) evidence on the effect of charter conversion on pupil 
intake. Finally, the evidence on Swedish free schools is also related to our work (Ahlin, 2003, 
Björklund et al., 2005, and Sandström and Bergström, 2005) – in particular the work by 
Bohlmark and Lindahl (2007) who show that free schools tend to enrol pupils from better off 
families and affect the composition of pupils in public sector schools.  
Although the background of the academy policy is unique and different from both the US 
charter movement and the Swedish free school programme, we believe our work sheds light on 
related issues about school reform that are of general interest. Firstly, we provide evidence on 
how the characteristics of pupils and schools change as the impetus of the programme changes 
from addressing underperformance to providing more autonomy to all schools. Secondly, we 
provide such evidence in a setting where expansion of a more autonomous school sector has not 
happened at the margin – but has taken centre stage and become a reality for more than 60% of 
secondary schools over a five-year period. These features make the on-going English academy 
reform a truly exceptional experiment in terms of its scale and celerity. Given the growing trend 
away from traditional schooling and towards more decentralised and autonomous systems with 
school accountability, our work holds relevant lessons for academics and policy makers alike. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
institutional context and the data we use in our empirical analysis. In Section 3 we spell out in 
more detail the methods that we use. Section 4 presents our results on the association between 
school characteristics and the probability of converting to academy, while Section 5 discusses 
our results on changes in pupil intake. Finally, Section 6 provides conclusions.  
2. Institutional Context and Data
2.1 The English school system 
Compulsory education in England is organised into Key Stages (KS) that stretch over the course 
of primary and secondary education. In terms of primary schooling, pupils enter school at age 4-
5. This is known as the Foundation Stage. They then move on to KS1 (up until age 6-7), before
finishing at KS2. The latter covers the last three years of primary schooling (ages 7-8 to 10-11), 
and ends with the externally-marked KS2 standardized national tests (SATs) where proficiency 
in English, Mathematics and Science is assessed.  
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Secondary schooling covers ages 11-12 through to ages 15-16 and is divided into KS3 (up 
to age 13-14) and KS4 (ages 14-15 and 15-16), which marks the end of compulsory education. 
At the end of KS4, pupils sit externally-marked academic (GCSEs) and/or vocational 
(NVQ/BTEC) tests in a range of subjects, although, English, Mathematics and Science are 
compulsory for every student at this stage. In our analysis, we focus on secondary schooling 
where the majority of conversions to academies has taken place. 
For each of the Key Stages the central government sets learning targets (levels) and runs a 
national curriculum. Average attainment within a school at the various Key Stages as well as 
measures of school value added are published alongside other school characteristics (such as 
size and composition) in annual performance tables. These are highly salient in the education 
and policy debate and the media. They are also routinely used by parents to inform their school 
choice.  
The principle of ‘free choice’ guides parental applications to schools and admissions 
practices at both the primary and the secondary phase. However, parental freedom to choose is 
limited when school are over-subscribed. When this occurs, various admissions criteria are used 
to prioritise students, usually favouring those who live nearby, those with special educational 
needs or in care of the Local Authority (LA), and those with siblings in the school. Religious 
schools can prioritise students according to their faith, while a small proportion of secondary 
schools select on admission tests (Grammar schools).  
The institutional arrangements of secondary schools determine more precisely whether the 
school, as opposed to the LA, holds responsibility for admissions and the margin of freedom the 
school enjoys over taught curriculum, personnel management and strategic decision making. 
Secondary schools can take one of the following alternative structures: community schools, 
voluntary-controlled (VC) schools, foundation schools, voluntary-aided (VA) schools, city 
technology colleges (CTCs) and, since their introduction in the early 2000s, academy schools.4 
Although academies are the focus of our work, we briefly discuss the structures of other school 
types for comparison. 
Community and VC schools are mainly managed by the LA and by a governing body 
predominantly composed of members of staff and LA representatives. Since the majority of VC 
schools are religiously denominated, their governing body also includes members of the 
foundation supporting the school. Responsibility for recruiting, human resources decisions and 
admissions is in the hands of the LEA. As a result, these schools are characterised by very little 
autonomy.  
4
 Any of these school types can be a selective ‘Grammar’ and admit pupils on the basis of entry tests. 
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VA and foundation schools are similarly structured – even though voluntary aided schools 
are mainly religiously denominated, while foundation schools are not. These two types of school 
are run as partnerships between the state and voluntary sector, and their associated foundations 
have a significant representation on their governing bodies. These institutional arrangements 
grant VA and foundation schools more autonomy than community and VC institutions.  
Similarly, CTCs enjoy relative autonomy from the LA. In particular, the majority of their 
governing body is filled with representatives of the sponsor – usually a business or voluntary 
group – and the school has control over staffing and admission decisions. However, CTCs 
follow the national teaching curriculum and are characterised by a strong emphasis on 
technological, scientific and practical subjects. 
Lastly, academy schools enjoy a much larger degree of autonomy than any of the other 
school types in the state system. Academies were gradually introduced by the Labour 
Government starting from September 2002 with the aim of replacing failing schools. In essence, 
the Labour Government designed the programme as a targeted intervention aimed at addressing 
underperformance by changing organizational structure, providing schools with more autonomy 
and linking schools to Government-approved sponsors enlisted to drive educational 
improvements. Indeed, sponsors – usually educational charities or business groups – were seen 
as crucial in bringing to schools a more entrepreneurial ‘ethos’.  
The election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in May 2010 
dramatically changed the aims of the programme. The Academies Act of June 2010 allowed as 
many schools as possible – including primaries – to ‘convert’ to academies and removed the 
requirement that would-be academies had to find a sponsor. Although a number of new Labour-
type ‘sponsored’ academies have opened since, approximately 80% of the expansion of the 
academy sector has happened through Coalition-type ‘converters’. 
Importantly, in the new regime, greater emphasis is put on the voluntary process of 
conversion to academy status. This is in marked contrast with the process characterising 
‘sponsored’ academies – where institutional change was imposed onto schools as a remedial 
tool. All that is required from would-be ‘converts’ is that they discuss the possibility of 
converting with parents, members of staff and pupils, and obtain consent from the foundation or 
religious body backing the school (if any). They must then register their intention to apply with 
the Department for Education (DfE) and send in information about school attainment, pupil 
progress and school finances for the past three years, before finally providing the most recent 
school report prepared by the school inspectorate (OFSTED).  
The latter is a key determinant of approval for conversion. OFSTED visits schools every 
three to five years (although this frequency depends on school performance, with poor 
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performers visited more regularly) and inspections result in publicly available reports rating 
schools from ‘Outstanding’ to ‘Inadequate’ on their overall quality as well as on specific aspects 
such as teaching, management and pupil behaviour.5 Schools with ‘Outstanding’ overall rating 
(and more recently schools with ‘Good, with Outstanding Features’ rating) are fast-tracked and 
pre-approved for conversion by the DfE. Broadly speaking, the process of (voluntary) 
conversion can take between three and five months, though the time lapse can expand and the 
exact timing depends on specific aspects of the proposed conversion and the volume of new 
applications. 
Despite these differences, both ‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’ academies enjoy similarly wide 
margins of autonomy. Although they remain part of the state sector, they broadly fall outside the 
control of the LA in terms of key strategic decisions and day-to-day management. This is 
administered by the head-teacher and a self-appointed board of governors with a limited number 
of representatives from the LA. This body has responsibility for hiring the staff, negotiating pay 
and working conditions, and deciding on matters such as career development, discipline and 
performance management. Furthermore, academies enjoy more autonomy in terms of the 
majority of the taught curriculum (except for English, Maths, Science and IT where they have to 
follow the national curriculum), as well as of the structure and length of the school day.  
2.2 Data construction and sample selection
The main data source used in our analysis is the National Pupil Database (NPD). The NPD is 
obtained by linking several centrally-gathered datasets that collect census-type information on 
the characteristics of all pupils in primary and secondary state education, their achievements at 
the various Key Stages, and the characteristics of the schools they attend. These databases are 
used by the DfE to assess schools’ performance and funding needs – mainly linked to the 
number of pupils on roll and measures of their disadvantage. The information they store is 
highly reliable and the datasets contain very few missing observations.  
A core element of the NPD is the Pupil Level Annual Census data (PLASC) which contains 
information on the characteristics of pupils – such as gender, eligibility for free school meals (a 
proxy for low parental income), ethnic background and special education needs status – as well 
as the identity of the school attended in every year of their schooling (and not just at the time 
when they sit for a Key Stage assessment). This is a crucial piece of information since it allows 
us to identify the school where pupils start their secondary education and evaluate any effect of 
academy conversion on pupil intake characteristics. PLASC has been collected three times per 
year (January, May and September) from the 2001/02 school year onwards. In our analysis, we 
5
 More details on OFSTED, its inspections and the possible outcomes are provided in Eyles and Machin (2015). 
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only use the January collection because this contains all relevant pupil level information and is 
the most consistently available over time.  
For our analysis, we also gather data on pupils’ KS2 and KS4 attainments. For KS2, we 
focus on test scores across the three compulsory subjects assessed at this stage – namely, 
English, Maths and Science. Test scores in Science span the 0-80 range (coming from the sum 
of two separate papers each marked out of 40), while the English and Maths tests are marked out 
of 100 (both composed of the sum of two separate test scores, each marked out of 50). We use 
KS2 test scores averaged across the three subjects. At KS4, we consider attainments in both the 
more academic GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) and the more vocationally-
oriented GNVQs and BTECs. GCSEs are graded A*-G and the current points score calculations 
give an A* a score of 58 and a G a score of 16 with grades in between going up in increments of 
6. GNVQ/BTEC subjects are instead graded as a combination of GCSE grades and often worth
multiple GCSEs. After converting GNVQ/BTEC attainments to a GCSE-comparable scale and 
making scores consistent over time6, we construct our measure of KS4 attainment by summing 
the grades obtained in the best eight qualifications. Capping qualifications at the best eight 
allows us to deal with the possibility that pupils entering many exams – but performing poorly 
on all of them – would still appear to do well. However, this restriction is inconsequential for 
our results.  
Finally, the NPD also collects information at the school level – in particular data on school 
types and institutional arrangements – through the Annual School Census and Edubase. We use 
these data in conjunction with files provided by the DfE, which give information on all 
academies that have opened (or are in the process of doing so), to identify schools that become 
academies, their time and mode of conversion (‘sponsored’ or ‘converter’ route), and the 
predecessor school that underwent transformation.  
We use this information to construct two datasets. The first one is a school-level panel 
covering the period spanning the school years 2001/2002 to 2012/2013. We use this dataset to 
study which school characteristics are associated with conversion to academy and investigate 
whether these associations change from the Labour Government years to the Coalition 
Government period. For our analysis, we only retain secondary schools that cover the whole of 
the Key Stage 3 and Key Stage 4 phases (age 11-12 to age 15-16); therefore, we drop middle 
schools (which stop at or before Key Stage 3) and upper secondary schools (which start after 
age 11-12). This restriction is motivated by the fact that our goal is to analyse the link between 
academy conversion and school characteristics – in particular the KS4/KS2 attainments of the 
predecessor school and average KS2 attainments of the intake at the school. Middle/upper 
6
 More details can be found in the Data Appendix of Eyles and Machin (2015). 
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secondary schools do not have the complete set of information we plan to use. We also drop a 
very small number of ‘anomalous’ cases. These include: (i) two schools that, for unexplained 
reasons, convert to academies later than expected. These are dropped because we would not be 
able to precisely align the timing of conversion with the characteristics of the school pre-
conversion; and (ii) three schools each splitting from one predecessor into more than one 
academy. These are dropped as it would be hard to link conversion to changes in intake in the 
newly formed academies relative to the one single pre-existing school. On the other hand, we 
keep a number of predecessor schools that merge into a single academy. In this case, we 
construct an artificial predecessor school by averaging across the characteristics of the different 
predecessors (averages are weighted by the number of pupils on roll at each school). Finally, we 
distinguish between schools that we can observe across all eleven years and those we cannot. 
We label these ‘balanced panel’/‘unbalanced panel’ schools, respectively.  
Table 1 reports the cumulative number of open academies in our sample over the years 
covered by our investigation.7 Overall, academies went from representing just a few exceptional 
cases in the early 2000s to covering more than half of secondary schools (Column 1). There are, 
of course, no ‘converters’ prior to the school year 2010/2011 (Column 2). Interestingly, the table 
shows that most of the academy sector expansion between 2010/2011 and 2012/2013 occurred 
through the ‘converter’ route. The number of ‘sponsored’ academies in our sample almost 
doubled – from 176 to 339 (Column 3). However, ‘converters’ went from zero in 2009/2010 to 
more than a thousand three years later. This represent about 80% of the overall expansion of the 
academy sector in this period. These patterns remain when we consider only schools in the 
balanced panel (as shown in Columns 4 to 6). 
Although our analysis only covers the period up to the school year 2012/2013, we also 
collect information on schools that convert in 2013/2014, 2014/2015 and 2015/2016. We use 
data published by the DfE in March 2015 to track academies already opened and/or planning to 
open soon after. As a result, we understate the number of academies that will start operating in 
the academic year 2015/2016. Despite this limitation, the figures for these last three school years 
continue to show that the expansion of the academic sector is mainly occurring through 
‘conversions’. Nevertheless, a number of Labour-type ‘sponsored’ academies have continued to 
open during the Coalition Government period.  
The second dataset that we construct is a pupil-level database that assigns pupils to the 
school they attend at the beginning of secondary school (when children are age 11-12 and right 
7
 Note that these numbers do not precisely match the official statistics published by the DfE because of the 
restrictions we impose on our data (mainly the fact that we do not consider middle/upper secondaries). However, 
our data reproduces the main national trends in terms of sector expansion and the relative importance of 
‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’ academies. 
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after the KS2 exams). We use this dataset to study whether schools converting to an academy 
change their pupil intake post-conversion. For most of our analysis, we only consider schools 
that convert to academies during the Coalition Government years – that is from the academic 
year 2010/2011 to present. This is because Wilson (2011) and Eyles and Machin (2015) have 
already presented evidence on the impact of Labour’s academies on pupil intake, reporting 
positive effects. However, in some cases, we provide complementary evidence for the Labour 
years. Note also that we apply the same restrictions as in the school-level dataset, and drop 
middle/upper secondary schools and anomalous conversions.  
Importantly, we only consider the following sets of pupils: (i) pupils enrolled at academies 
that open between 2010/2011 and 2012/2013 in the time-window covering six school years prior 
to conversion and up to two school years after conversion; and (ii) pupils enrolled at academies 
that will open between 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 in the time window going from six school 
years to one school year prior to conversion. These restrictions are applied so that our analysis 
of the effect of academy conversion on pupil intake composition compares the changes in the 
composition of actual academies (pre- and post-conversion) to changes in the composition of 
future academies. The use of future academies as a comparison group reduces the extent to 
which compositional changes caused by academy conversion are conflated with natural year-on 
year variation in KS2 scores. As well as this, it allows us to net out unobservable school-level 
characteristics, such as the ‘ethos’ of academy status, from our estimates. We return to this issue 
in the next section, where we discuss our empirical methods.  
3. Empirical methods
3.1 Research design I – School characteristics and academy conversion 
In the first part of our analysis, we investigate which characteristics predict academy conversion 
and whether the association between these characteristics and academy status changes between 
the Labour and the Coalition Government periods.  
In order to do so, we estimate the following linear probability model for school s in year t: 
 =  + ,	
  ×  ≤ 2010 +	,	
  ×  > 2010 + ,	
 + ,	
	+	 + 	   (1)
where  is a dummy variable coded equal to zero when school s is not an academy, one in the
school year in which school s starts operating as an academy, and missing after that point, ,	

is a set of school attributes measured in the school year prior to the conversion,  ≤ 2010 is a
binary indicator taking value one for observations up to the school year 2009/2010 (and zero 
otherwise) identifying the ‘Labour Years’,  > 2010 is a binary indicator taking value one
for observations from the school year 2010/2011 onwards (and zero otherwise) identifying the 
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‘Coalition Years’, and ,	
 is a set of dummies characterising the institutional type of the
predecessor schools (e.g. community or voluntary controlled - see Section 2.1). ,	
 is a set of
dummies denoting the Local Authority in which the predecessor school is located (as well as the 
academy - there are no cross-LA relocations) and  are school-year dummies. Finally,  is an
error term which we assume to be uncorrelated with all other observable characteristics in the 
model. However, we allow for a degree of autocorrelation in the residuals within schools over 
time, and cluster standard errors at the school level.  
The parameters of interest are  and  which capture the associations between school
characteristics and the probability of conversion in the ‘Labour Years’ and ‘Coalition Years’, 
respectively. The differences between these coefficients (and their statistical significance) are 
key to this paper since they allow us to test the notion that the nature of academies has changed 
since the Academies Act of 2010.8  
The way in which we have specified the dependent variable makes our analysis similar to a 
transition model in which schools are ‘at risk’ of becoming academies. This allows us to isolate 
the effect of school characteristics at time t-1 on the probability of conversion at time t – without 
confounding this estimate with the effect of these characteristics on the probability of being an 
academy from time t onwards (i.e. survival). Since academies do not convert back to non-
academy status, the observations after conversion has occurred do not add any useful element of 
variation to our analysis and are essentially disregarded (by coding our dependent variable as 
missing). 
In our analysis, we are also interested in analysing whether the association between school 
characteristics and academy status changes for different types of academies. For example, 
during the Coalition Government years we observer schools becoming ‘converter’ (Coalition-
type) as well as ‘sponsored’ (Labour-type) academies. Moreover, both type of academies can be 
‘stand-alone’ or be part of a ‘chain’ – i.e. belong to a group working together under a shared 
structure and jointly administered by an Academy Trust.  
To test for these differences, we estimate the following model: 
 !" =  + ,	
 # + ,	
 + ,	
 +  +  (2) 
where (2) redefines the  dependent variable to take value one only for academy transitions into a 
specific subgroup – for example only ‘chain academies’ – and taking values zero or missing as 
8
 These differences can be estimated by changing our specification to have a set of main effects for each school 
characteristic (e.g. by dropping the interaction between school characteristics and the  variable) and only one set of 
interactions (e.g. the interaction between the  and the school characteristics). In this case, the coefficients on the 
interactions capture the change in the association between school characteristics and the likelihood of conversion to 
academy across the two periods. 
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previously discussed. In order to test whether the effect of school characteristics on the 
probability of becoming an academy are significantly different across subgroups, we set the 
problem up as a seemingly unrelated equation system so that our tests for the differences in the 
# parameters take into account the joint variance/covariance structure of the error terms across
equations.  
3.2 Key descriptive statistics: School-level data 
Table 2.a presents descriptive statistics of the main variables that we use in our school-level 
analysis. The dependent variable ‘Academy’ takes a mean value of 0.041 across the period, 
although this figure varies substantially from the Labour years (0.007) to the Coalition years 
(0.161). This marked difference is due to the fact that many more academies opened since 
2010/2011. The figures for the school characteristics we consider (measured in the school year 
prior to conversion) reveal that our set of schools is broadly representative of secondary schools 
in England. Approximately 16% of the pupils are eligible for free meals and nearly 80% are of 
White ethnic origin. KS2 attainment of pupils aged 11-12 in their first year of secondary school 
has a mean value of approximately 64, while KS4 scores of pupils aged 15-16 are, on average, 
just above 315. In terms of OFSTED inspections, the most recurrent grade is ‘Grade 2’ (Good) 
at around 43-44%. Many schools achieve ‘Grade 1’ (Outstanding; 21%) and Grade 3 
(Satisfactory; 30%). Only 4.5-5% receive a low ‘Grade 4’ evaluation (Unsatisfactory and 
necessitating improvements). Approximately 60% of all predecessors schools are either 
community (57.5%) or VC schools (2.7%) which have little autonomy prior to becoming 
academies. Note that there are no noticeable differences between the unbalanced and unbalanced 
panel schools.  
3.3 Research design II – Academy conversion and school intake 
In the second part of our analysis, we investigate whether schools converting to academy change 
their pupil intake following conversion. In order to do so, we use pupil-level data (described in 
Section 2.2) and estimate the following model: 
$% =  +  + & × ' ≥  = ) + *% (3) 
where $% denotes the background of pupil i (aged 11-12) starting secondary school s in school
year t, 	 and  denote school and time fixed effects respectively,  denotes whether the
school becomes an academy at some point during the observation window, and ' ≥  = ) is
an indicator variable taking value one for all school years in which the school is operating as an 
academy – that is at or after conversion c has taken place. Finally, *% is an error term which we
assume to be uncorrelated with all other observable characteristics in the model. We allow for a 
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degree of autocorrelation in the residuals of pupils in the same school and over years, and cluster 
standard errors at the school level.  
The main coefficient of interest is & which captures the effect of academy conversion on
intake. One concern with our specification is that it only controls for time-fixed school 
unobservables; however, schools that become/do not become academies could differ along other 
unobservable dimensions that might be time varying and/or time trending. In order to mitigate 
this problem, we only estimate the model in Equation (3) using observations from the following 
subset of pupils (already discussed in Section 2.2): firstly,  pupils enrolled at schools that 
become academies between 2010/2011 and 2012/2013 and in the time-window covering six 
school years prior to conversion and up to two school years after conversion; secondly, pupils 
enrolled at schools that will become academies between 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 and in the 
time window going from six school years to one school year prior to conversion. This approach 
basically compares the evolution of the intake at schools that actually open as academies during 
our observation period (pre- and post- conversion) to the evolution of the intake at schools that 
will open as academies in the near future. Identification rests on the assumption that the two 
groups of schools are on similar trends and share similar (possibly time-varying) unobservables, 
and that the timing of the actual opening is ‘as good as random’. We discuss the validity of this 
assumption when we present our findings. 
The empirical model in Equation (3) imposes an average effect of academy conversion on 
intake quality that is constant across all post-conversion years. To relax this assumption, we 
estimate the following flexible event study specification where we allow for separate ‘academy 
effects’ in the different school years post- and pre- conversion: 
$% =  +  + + &, × ' = -
,./01
,./	2
+ *% (4) 
where the expression ' = - denotes a set of indicators that separately identify the school
years prior to conversion year ) (from ) − 5 to ) − 1; with )	 − 6 being the excluded baseline
year) and at/after conversion (from ) to ) + 2), and &, capture the effect of academy status on
intake in that specific year. Note that estimates of &, for the years prior to conversion allow us
to determine whether actual converters (the ‘treated’ schools) differ from future converters (the 
‘control’ schools) in the years leading up to the ‘switch’ to academy. This helps us assessing the 
assumptions that treated and control schools have similar (possibly time varying/trending) 
unobservables prior to conversion, and that the timing of conversion is random. 
As for the school-level analysis of the determinants of conversion, we are also interested in 
understanding whether the effects on intake are heterogeneous for different types of academies. 
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In particular, we are interested in disentangling whether ‘Sponsored’ and ‘Converter’ academies 
change their intake after conversion in different ways, and whether ‘Stand-alone’ vs. ‘Chain’ 
academies affect their intake differently. In order to do so, we interact the variable )67-89 in
Equation (3) above with an indicator denoting whether the academy belong to ones of these 
groups. Finally, in some extensions, we also investigate whether the impact of academies on 
intake differ depending on the institutional type of the predecessor school (mainly ‘community’ 
schools as opposed to all other institutional arrangements). 
3.4 Key descriptive statistics: pupil-level data 
In Table 2.b we present descriptive statistics on the characteristics of pupils in the estimation 
sample. These are the variables we use to characterise pupils’ background (i.e. the variables 
$6):;<=>?7% in Equations 3 and 4). KS2 attainment of pupils when they enter secondary
school (aged 11-12) are on average 66-68 points – 3 to 4 points above the corresponding figure 
in the school level panel. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that the pupil level data only 
focuses on more recent cohorts and KS2 scores have been rising over time. The percentage of 
pupils eligible for free meals (at 14%) is close to the figure found at the school level, as is the 
percentage of pupils with White ethnic origins (at 79%). Finally, approximately 41% of the 
pupils are in schools that were ‘community’ prior to conversion. This figure is lower than the 
share of community schools in the school level panel (at 57%). This is due to the fact that the 
pupil level sample only includes actual and future academies, and school types other than 
‘community’ are more likely to convert during the Coalition period. 
4. The changing characteristics of academies
4.1 Preliminary graphical evidence 
We present our first set of results graphically in Figure 1. The four plots display the mean 
academy percentile in the non-academy distribution of school characteristics in the year prior to 
conversion for the following four attributes: KS4 attainment (top left panel), KS2 attainment 
(top right panel), percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals (FSM, bottom left panel), 
and percentage of pupils with White ethnic background (bottom right panel). The figure also 
reports the mean percentile for academies that convert during the Labour Government years and 
the mean percentile for the Coalition Government years. The approach we take in Figure 1 is an 
adaptation of the methods used in Juhn et al. (1993) and is structured to highlight changes in the 
characteristics of converting schools, before and after the Academies Act of June 2010, in a 
descriptive and intuitive way. 
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The top two panels provide fairly sharp evidence of these changes: the KS4 and KS2 
percentiles of schools that convert during the Labour period (measured up to 2009 for 
conversions up to 2010) are substantially lower than those for the Coalition period. The average 
Labour academy KS4 percentile is 15, whereas the KS2 percentile is 17. These numbers are 
clearly pulled up by the 2005 data point (referring to ten academies converting in 2006). 
Excluding this year, the figures for the KS4 and KS2 average percentile fall to 11 and 12 
respectively. This finding is not surprising: Labour ‘sponsored’ academies were among the 
worst performing schools and academisation was seen as a way to improve standards. In sharp 
contrast, the average KS4 and KS2 percentiles for the years following the election of the 
Coalition Government are at or above the median. Strikingly, in the first full school year after 
the Academies Act of June 2010 (that is for conversions in the school year 2010/2011 with 
characteristics measured in 2009/2010), academies’ average percentiles are around 80 for both 
KS2 and KS4.  
In the bottom two panels of the figure, we investigate whether similar changes can be 
detected in the school composition in terms of pupils’ eligibility for FSM and ethnic 
background. The left panel shows that, during the Labour years, the average percentile for FSM 
eligibility was close to 90. This finding is also not surprising: Labour academies were among the 
most disadvantaged inner city schools, serving very deprived communities. This pattern changes 
substantially during the Coalition period. The average percentile falls to 57 and the drop is 
substantially more pronounced (down to 33) if we focus on the first full school year after the 
Academies Act of June 2010. Interestingly, the bottom right panel shows that changes in the 
percentage of FSM eligible pupils (and in Key Stage attainments) are not mirrored by changes in 
the ethnic composition of schools that convert. The average percentile in the distribution of the 
percentage of pupils with White ethnic background goes from 20 (Labour period) to 33 
(Coalition period). This change is clearly less pronounced than for the other three 
characteristics.  
4.2 Main regression analysis 
In this section, we provide more formal evidence on the changes in the nature of academies by 
estimating the model laid out in Equation (1) in Section 3.1. Our estimates are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4, where we focus on schools in the unbalanced and balanced panels, respectively. 
The two tables have the same structure: in the top panel, we consider the effect of school 
characteristics (measured at time t-1) individually on the probability of conversion (at time t); in 
the central panel, we consider all these characteristics simultaneously by including them in our 
specification; finally, the bottom panel considers all characteristics simultaneously and controls 
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for the LA where the school is located and the institutional type of the predecessor school. 
Columns (1) and (4) present the effect of school characteristics on conversion in the Labour 
years, while Columns (2) and (5) present estimates for the Coalition period, and Columns (3) 
and (6) tabulate the difference between the effects for the Labour and Coalition periods. The 
first three columns use average KS4 test scores as a measure of attainment, whereas the last 
three columns use average KS2 test scores. Note that all variables have been standardized so 
that the coefficients display the effect of a one standard deviation change in the characteristics 
on the probability of conversion. 
Starting with the top panel, our results show that during the Labour years lower KS2 and 
KS4 attainments, a higher share of FSM pupils and a lower share of White pupils were all 
positively and significantly associated with probability of conversion. This pattern is completely 
reversed during the Coalition years: higher KS4 and KS2 attainment, a lower percentage of FSM 
pupils and a higher incidence of White students are strongly associated with the probability of 
becoming an academy. As shown in Columns (3) and (6), the differences in these associations 
are both striking – the coefficients push in opposing directions – and highly significant. These 
results hold irrespective of whether we consider the unbalanced or balanced panel of schools. As 
for the percentage of male pupils in the school, we find that this is not strongly associated with 
academisation during either period, and its effect does not change significantly across the 
Labour and Coalition years. 
In Panel B, we test the robustness of these effects by including all characteristics 
simultaneously. We still find that lower KS2 and KS4 attainments are strongly associated with 
the probability of becoming an academy during the Labour year, but the opposite is true during 
the Coalition period. We also find that the difference between these effects is highly significant. 
Furthermore, a higher share of disadvantaged pupils from poor family background (i.e. those 
eligible for FSM) has a positive and significant association with conversion to academy during 
the Labour period, but a negative and significant association during the Coalition years. Once 
again, the difference in these estimates is sizeable and significant. These patterns hold 
irrespective of whether we use the balanced or unbalanced panel. Once we take into account 
attainment and eligibility for FSM, the share of pupils with White ethnic background is no 
longer associated with the probability of academisation, neither before nor after 2010. We still 
find no evidence of a significant association between the percentage of males in the school and 
conversion to academy.  
Finally, in Panel C, we control for the institutional type of the predecessor schools and for 
the LA where the school is located. Despite a reduction in the precision of some of our 
estimates, our key findings still hold in Tables 3 and 4. Coalition academies are significantly 
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more likely to have high KS2 and KS4 attainment prior to conversion than Labour academies. 
They also have significantly lower percentages of FSM pupils in the year before becoming 
academies than their Labour counterparts. In short, they are better performing schools enrolling 
pupils from more advantageous backgrounds. The last row of the table shows that a higher 
incidence of White pupils is now positively associated with conversion to academy during the 
Labour years. Since this specification controls for LA effects, this association could be driven 
by the fact that the first batch of Labour academies took place in inner cities where a higher 
incidence of White students is linked with disadvantage and economic hardship. This 
association is instead not significant for the Coalition period, nor is the difference between the 
coefficients across the two periods. Since the pattern of the estimates we find for the school’s 
ethnic composition switches signs when moving from the top to the bottom panel (and is 
insignificant in the central panel) we prefer not to attach too much significance to this estimate 
and avoid (over-)interpreting in the rest of the paper. 
How sizeable are the effects we have documented? To answer this question we use the 
estimates of Panel B of Table 4. Starting with attainments, a one standard deviation increase in 
test scores corresponds to a 57% (= 0.004/0.007) decrease in the probability of becoming an 
academy during the Labour years. Conversely, a one standard deviation change in either KS2 or 
KS4 test scores would increase the probability of becoming an academy during the Coalition 
period by 20-24%. Stated differently, a school one standard deviation below average KS4 
attainments (approximately at the bottom 15th percentile assuming KS4 scores follow a Normal 
distribution) would be 57% more likely to become an academy during the Labour years, but 
24% less likely to do so during the Coalition period. Note also that the estimates capturing the 
change in the effect of attainments on the probability of becoming an academy are fairly 
constant at 4.3 percentage points for KS4, and 3.5 percentage points for KS2 (once we include 
all school characteristics at the same time). This is independent of whether we consider the 
balanced or unbalanced panel, and irrespective of whether we control for LA and predecessor 
type dummies. This means that a one standard deviation change in attainment would have 
pushed schools in opposing directions by around 3-4 percentage points before and after the 
Academies Act of 2010. Scaled against an average probability of conversion over the whole 
period of 4.1%, this is a truly sizeable change. 
In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of the percentage of pupils eligible for FSM at 
the school we consider a 10% change from the mean of 15.6% (rather than using a one standard 
deviation change which would represent an 83% change in the mean). This corresponds to 
approximately 12% of a standard deviation change. During the Labour years, an increase in the 
percentage of FSM eligible pupils of this magnitude would have corresponded to a 75% increase 
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in the probability of becoming an academy. Conversely, during the Coalition years this same 
increase would have reduced the probability of conversion by 13%. Once again, the change in 
the association between the percentage of FSM students and the probability of becoming and 
academy pre/post 2010 is fairly stable across specifications at -0.22, or 2.7 percentage points for 
a 10% change. Benchmarked against the average probability of conversion across all year (of 
0.041), the change in the direction of the effect of this variable is also very substantial. 
4.3 Further results 
In Table 5, we present additional results on the changing characteristics of academies. All 
regressions enter school characteristics simultaneously and control for both LA dummies and 
predecessor school type.9  
Panel A repeats the analysis of Table 4, but adds dummies capturing the results of the last 
OFSTED inspection prior to conversion. The omitted category is ‘Grade 1’ (Outstanding). Note 
that since we are not able to collect consistent OFSTED data for the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
we lose some schools for which we are unable to gather inspection results pre-conversion. The 
results show that during the Labour years schools with lower inspection results – in particular 
Grade 4 schools – were more likely to become academies, even though the point estimates are 
statistically insignificant. However, this finding is completely reversed during the Coalition 
years: the three coefficients on the dummies for the OFSTED inspection results are negative and 
significant. The last column confirms that the changes in these associations pre- and post-2010 
are statistically significant and sizeable, in particular for Grade 3 (Satisfactory) and Grade 4 
(Unsatisfactory). We also find that controlling for OFSTED inspections does not affect the 
change in the association between the percentage of FSM eligible pupils and academy 
conversion. However, the changes in the association between academy and KS4 test scores are 
reduced – although they remain sizeable and significant. This is not surprising since OFSTED 
inspections incorporate an assessment about the quality of teaching which should translate into 
higher KS4 attainment (at least in as much as these do not solely capture family background and 
pupils’ own ability, as opposed to school effectiveness). 
In Panel B of the table we investigate whether the changes in the associations between the 
Labour years and the Coalition years (Table 3 and 4) completely reflect the differences between 
‘sponsored’ and ‘converter’ academies. We find that the patterns in the coefficients very closely 
resemble our previous findings: the association between KS4 attainment is negative and 
significant for ‘sponsored’ academies, but becomes positive and significant for ‘converters’. On 
the other hand, the association between the share of FSM eligible pupils and ‘sponsored’ 
9
 Appendix Table 1 reports estimates from specifications where we drop LA and predecessor type dummies. 
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academies is positive and significant, but becomes negative (though insignificant) for 
‘converters’. Once again, we find that for both variables the change in these associations is 
significant. Note also that rescaled against the probability of converting through a ‘sponsored’ or 
a ‘converter’ route the magnitudes of the associations presented in Panel B are similar to those 
displayed in Tables 3 and 4. Furthermore, the associations between KS4 test scores/the 
percentage of FSM eligible pupils and the probability of becoming a ‘sponsored’ academy are 
fairly stable if we estimate them separately for the years up to and after 2010. In short, most of 
the Labour years vs. Coalition years dichotomy documented above can be explained by the 
differences between schools that become academies via the two alternative routes. 
Lastly, in Panel C we investigate whether the association between school characteristics 
and conversion differs for academies that belong to chains and those that are instead stand-
alone. We find that stand-alone academies have significantly higher KS4 test scores in the year 
prior to conversion than academies in chains. However, the size of the difference in this 
association is reduced relative to what we found before. Furthermore, we find that chain 
academies are not significantly less likely to have a higher fraction of FSM eligible pupils prior 
to conversion than stand-alone academies. Although the point estimate on the percentage of 
pupils eligible for FSM is higher for school that convert to chain academies (at 0.059) than for 
stand-alone ones (at 0.046), the two coefficients are not statistically different. Finally, we do not 
find any significantly different association between the share of males and the share of pupils 
with White ethnic background and the probability of becoming a chain academy as opposed to a 
stand-alone one. This reinforces our previous conclusion that the interesting margin is between 
the Labour and Coalition years, and that this margin tends to closely match  the ‘sponsored’ vs. 
‘converter’ dichotomy. 
5. Academies and changes in intake composition
5.1 Main regression analysis 
Table 6 presents our first set of results on changes in intake composition. This comes from 
estimates of the empirical models in Equations (3) and (4) in Section 3.2. The four different 
columns look at different aspects of a school’s intake composition: Column (1) focuses on the 
(standardized) KS2 test scores of pupils, Column (2) instead focuses on whether the student is 
eligible for FSM or not; lastly, Columns (3) and (4) investigate the effect of academisation on 
the probability that enrolled pupils are male or are of White ethnic origin.  
Panel A and Panel B reports estimates of the average effect of conversion during the 
Coalition years on intake using pupils in the unbalanced and balanced panel of schools, 
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respectively. The results in Column (1) show that becoming an academy during the Coalition 
period does not lead to changes in the KS2 of enrolled pupils. Recall that KS2 tests are taken at 
the end of primary schools (i.e. they are a measure of prior ability) and that we are considering 
the school where pupils start their secondary education. Our findings therefore suggest that 
Coalition academies do not change their composition in terms of students’ ability. Column (2) 
shows that after conversion the Coalition-year academies attract pupils who are less likely to be 
eligible for FSM. This effect is precisely estimated and corresponds to approximately a 4% 
reduction in the probability that an FSM eligible pupil is enrolled at an academy. Columns (3) 
and (4) show that academies do not change their composition in terms of gender and ethnic 
background after conversion. 
In Panel C, we shed some light on the time profile of these effects. To do so, we estimate 
the model laid out in Equation (4) in Section 3.2. Column (1) shows a positive and significant 
effect on pupils’ KS2 attainment two years after conversion (at 6.5% of a standard deviation). 
However, we find no effect at the time of conversion (-0.003) and a small but insignificant 
effect one year after (at 0.013). It is interesting to note that the coefficients on the years leading 
up to the time of conversion are small and insignificant (with the exception of c-5) suggesting 
that actual academies (the treated group) are balanced in terms of their pupils’ ability relative to 
future academies (the control schools) before the switch. This lends some support to our 
identifying strategy, which assumes that the timing of conversion is as good as random (at least 
within the subset of schools we have chosen – actual and future converters; see Section 3.2 for a 
discussion). Column (2) reveals that the average effect of conversion on FSM eligible pupils 
found in Panels A and B comes from the estimate of the impact in the year after the first in 
which the academy has opened (c+1). Conversely, the impact at time t is still negative, but small 
and imprecisely estimated (-0.007), while the impact at time c+2 is zero. Once again, we find no 
evidence of differential pre-trends between ‘treated’ (actual academies) and ‘controls’ (future 
academies), lending support to our approach. Finally, Column (3) and (4) confirm that 
academies do not change the gender and ethnic composition of their students. 
How robust are these findings? As discussed, our sample includes only pupils in schools 
that convert between 2011 and 2013 in a time window going from six years prior to conversion 
to up to two years after (‘treated’ schools), and pupils in schools that will convert in 2014, 2015 
and 2016 from six years to one year prior to conversion (‘control’ schools). This approach was 
taken to reduce potentially unobservable time-varying differences between treated and controls, 
and to guarantee we could test for pre-treatment effects using an equal number of (school-year) 
observations for the two groups. However, this approach is not the only one we have 
experimented with. Appendix Table 2 reports a battery of tests to assess the robustness of our 
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findings to changes in the definition of the control group. Overall, we find that our results are 
robust to these changes.  
Starting with Panel A, we redefine the control group to include all the observations in 
future converters between 2005 and 2013 (as opposed to between c-6 and c-1 from conversion –
as for our main control group). The school year 2005 was chosen because it corresponds to c-6 
for the first batch of converters (those with conversion year c in 2011). Thus we ‘block’ the 
beginning of the observation window of the control group to the first school year of the treated, 
and consider all periods up to the end of the sample (2013). This approach fully confirm our 
findings. Next, in Panel B we deal with possible spill-over effects across adjacent cohorts of 
converters. To do so, we use only pupils in future converters opening in 2016 to construct our 
comparison group. This does not affect our findings. Finally, in Panel C we drop all pupils in the 
comparison group of future converters and estimate our effects out of the timing of opening of 
the actual converters. This approach also confirms our findings.  
Before moving on, it is worth commenting on the size of the effects we have documented 
and compare them to the impact of academy conversion during the Labour years. To do so, the 
bottom panel of Table 6 considers pupils in schools that become academies between 2003 and 
2010 (again in a time window spanning [c-6, c+2] around the time of opening c) and pupils 
enrolled at schools that become ‘sponsored’ academies in 2011, 2012 and 2013 (from six years 
prior to conversion to 2010, before the election of the Coalition Government). This approach 
essentially reproduces the method we have used to assess the effect of academies on intake 
during the Coalition years, and uses the Labour-type ‘sponsored’ academies in the Coalition 
period as controls for the academies of the Labour years. Our results show that Labour 
academies significantly change their intake after conversion (confirming the earlier findings of 
Wilson, 2011 and Eyles and Machin, 2015). The effect on KS2 is precisely estimated and 
corresponds to a 3.1% of a standard deviation change, on average, over the three periods post-
conversion. This compares to a zero estimated effect for the academies opened during the 
Coalition period. Furthermore, we find that Labour academies significantly reduced their intake 
of pupils eligible for FSM. The estimated effect – at around 9% of the baseline probability – is 
twice as sizeable as the one we found for the Coalition years. Finally, Labour academies also 
attract fewer pupils of White ethnic origin – while we found no effect for the Coalition years.  
5.2 Heterogeneous effects on intake  
In Table 7 we investigate whether the effects of conversion during the Coalition years on intake 
are heterogeneous and depend on whether academies are ‘sponsored’ as opposed to ‘converters’, 
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or part of a chain instead ‘stand-alone’ institutions. We focus only on KS2 test scores and 
pupils’ eligibility for FSM since these are the variables where we detected significant effects. 
The first three columns of Panel A reveal some evidence of heterogeneity. Whereas 
‘converter’ academies do not experience any change in the ability of their pupil intake, Labour-
type ‘sponsored’ academies that open during the Coalition years attract students with 
significantly higher KS2 test scores. The estimated effect corresponds to 4.6% of standard 
deviation for KS2 scores with the difference between the impact of ‘coalition’ and ‘sponsored’ 
academies being significant. This pattern suggests that zero effect documented in Table 6 is 
driven by ‘converters,’ and that ‘sponsored’ academies opening after the Academies Act of 2010 
more closely resemble the ‘sponsored’ of the Labour period – at least when it comes to changes 
in their pupil intake. The next three columns of Panel A focus on pupils’ eligibility for FSM and 
reveal yet another dimension of heterogeneity. We now find that ‘converters’ are associated 
with a reduction in the share of FSM eligible pupils and drive the overall negative effect 
presented in Table 6. Conversely, ‘sponsored’ academies attract pupils who are more likely to 
be eligible for FSM after conversion – with an estimated effect of approximately 9%. As shown 
in the last column, the difference between these two coefficients is clearly significant. This 
suggests that along this margin the Labour and the Coalition years ‘sponsored’ academies are 
not very comparable.  
In Panel B, we provide evidence on of the effect of ‘chain’ and stand-alone’ academies on 
intake. The first three columns show that neither group significantly affects the KS2 
composition of its pupil intake ability. This mirrors the overall result we found before. The last 
three columns however show that ‘stand-alone’ academies tend to attract pupils that are less 
likely to be eligible for FSM. The estimated effect is approximately 5% of the baseline 
probability and the difference between ‘chain’ and ‘stand-alone’ academies is significant.  
To benchmark the latter results, in Panel C we reproduce the analysis considering ‘chain’ 
and ‘stand-alone’ academies that opened during the Labour years. The first three columns 
continue show that academies during this period experienced an increase in the average KS2 
attainment of enrolled pupils. Although this effect is larger and statistically significant only for 
‘stand-alone’ academies, the effect for schools that convert to become part of a chain is also 
positive and the two coefficients are not statistically different. Conversely, we find more 
heterogeneity when considering the effects on the percentage of FSM eligible pupils. ‘Stand-
alone’ Labour academies experienced a decrease in the share of disadvantaged students – a 
pattern that we also found for Coalition-period ‘stand-alone’ academies. However, we find that 
Labour-period ‘chain’ academies also decreased their intake of FSM eligible students – this was 
not the case for their Coalition-year equivalents.  
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We also investigate whether there are interesting patterns of heterogeneity when we 
consider cross-group of conversion types, that is ‘chain converters’ ‘chain sponsored’, ‘stand-
alone converters’ and ‘stand-alone sponsored’ (see Appendix Table 4). Although the results 
become somewhat noisier, we still find that ‘sponsored’ academies in the Coalition years 
experienced significant improvements in the average KS2 of their pupils – irrespective of 
whether they are in a chain or stand alone. This is not true for ‘converters’ of any type. We also 
confirm the pattern detected in the top panel of Table 7 showing that ‘sponsored’ academies 
increase their intake of FSM eligible pupils. However, the negative effects we found for 
‘converters’ mainly come from stand-alone academies that experience a significant decrease in 
the percentage of disadvantaged students of approximately 6%.  
We conclude our analysis by studying whether we detect some heterogeneity in the effect 
of conversion depending on whether the predecessor was a ‘community’ school or not. Our 
results are presented in Table 8. The top panel studies this dimension of heterogeneity alongside 
the ‘sponsored’/‘converter’ dichotomy; the bottom panel instead focuses on the ‘chain’/‘stand-
alone’ divide.10 Once again, we find that ‘sponsored’ academies experience a significant 
increase in the average KS2 of pupils on roll (approximately 4%) irrespective of the predecessor 
school type. This is also the case for ‘converters’ academies that switch from non-community 
schools. However, community schools that become ‘converter’ academies do not experience 
significant changes in the ability of enrolled pupils. We also continue to find that ‘sponsored’ 
academies enrol a higher proportion of students eligible for FSM, while ‘converters’ attract a 
lower share of disadvantaged pupils. There is however no evidence that these effects are 
heterogeneous depending on the institutional type of the predecessor school. Similarly, the 
patterns of heterogeneity are not particularly marked when we consider the effects of ‘chain’ 
and ‘stand-alone’ academies alongside the type of predecessor schools. We find relatively 
modest and positive effects on average KS2 attainments – though these effects are more marked 
for community schools that convert to ‘chain’ academies (0.020, insignificant) and non-
community schools that become ‘stand-alone’ converters. We also find that the share of FSM 
eligible pupils enrolled at ‘stand-alone’ decreases after the school becomes an academy – 
irrespective of predecessor’s type – and that this effect is less evident for chain academies.  
To sum up, the patterns of heterogeneity of our findings  lend some support to the idea that 
‘sponsored’ academies in the Coalition years are relatively comparable to Labour-period 
academies – at least when it comes to changes in the ability of pupils they enrol. This confirms 
the insights of the analysis in the Section 4.3 (and related Table 5) which showed that the 
10
 Appendix Table 3 studies heterogeneity depending on the predecessor type but without considering the 
‘sponsored’/‘converter’ and ‘chain’/‘stand-alone’ dimensions. We do not detect very significant patterns. 
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association between schools characteristics and academy conversion during the Labour years is 
similar to the one we document for ‘sponsored’ academies – irrespective of the period of 
conversion. On the other hand, the pattern of heterogeneity on the percentage of FSM eligible 
pupils enrolled after conversion suggests that ‘sponsored’ academies of the Coalition period 
might still be different from the ‘sponsored’ academies of the Labour years. 
6. Conclusions
The last ten to fifteen years have seen radical developments in the English education landscape. 
The most salient change has been the introduction of academies – autonomous schools that 
remain part of the state sector, but operate largely outside the control of the local education 
authorities. Academies were first introduced by the Labour Government in the early 2000 as a 
remedial intervention aimed at turning around failing schools. However, the Coalition 
Government elected in May 2010 quickly and dramatically changed the aims of the programme 
and pushed for an acceleration of the academisation of state education with the aim of 
promoting autonomy and competition – and thereby increasing education standards. 
The aim of this paper was to study whether the nature of academies has changed as a result 
of this shift. In order to do so, we have investigated and contrasted the characteristics associated 
with conversion during the Labour Government years and the Coalition Government period. We 
have also studied how the composition of schools that become academies after 2010 changes as 
a result of conversion, and whether the association between academisation and changes in intake 
differs across different types of academies and in the Labour and Coalition years.  
Broadly speaking our evidence leaves no doubts that the second batch of academies differ 
from the first – sometimes very markedly. Schools that convert during the Labour years have 
low attainment and a high share of disadvantaged students eligible for free school meals. The 
opposite is true for schools that become academies after the election of the Coalition 
Government in May 2010. We also find that the new academies tend to experience no changes 
in terms of the ability of the students they enrol, and limited changes in the percentage of 
children from poor family background and eligible for free meals. This is in contrast to evidence 
for the Labour academies which shows significant improvements in the ability of enrolled 
students and more substantial declines in the percentage of disadvantaged pupils after 
conversion.  
Altogether this suggests that simple extrapolation from the evidence on the effects of the 
first batch of conversions to the second batch is clearly not warranted and potentially very 
misleading. This finding is important because extrapolation is commonplace among 
policymakers, media commentators and – in some cases – academics. Nevertheless, our results 
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also point to some commonalities between the two programmes. ‘Sponsored’ academies – 
originally introduced by Labour but also proliferating during the Coalition period – have fairly 
similar pre-conversion characteristics during both regimes. Moreover, they tend to change the 
ability of their pupil intake in similar ways across all years – even though the change in the 
percentage of disadvantaged pupils they attract is somewhat divergent for the two batches. This 
suggests that a comparison of ‘sponsored’ academies in both regimes may be relatively 
legitimate and that an extrapolation of the lessons learned for the Labour academies might apply 
to a subset of Coalition academies. Despite this, it is important to stress that the academy sector 
has predominantly expanded through the ‘converter’ route. Our analysis reveals that there is too 
little overlap between the nature of these academies and the Labour batch to warrant any 
meaningful extrapolation. 
More broadly, our paper holds important lessons for the debate about the consequences of 
autonomy in state education. The revamped academy programme launched in May 2010 by the 
Coalition Government is an education experiment of an unprecedented scale in which highly 
performing – as well as struggling schools – are allowed more independence with the hope that 
this will bring improvements in education standards across the board. In the span of five years, 
these autonomous institutions have gone from being a very small reality to representing more 
than 60% of secondary and 15% of primary schools – dwarfing by comparison the US charter 
revolution and the Swedish free school experiment.  
One of the main concerns with such a vast-scale expansion of autonomy and differentiation 
in education has been the risk of increased stratification – with students of different background 
segregated in different schools – either because of differential parental preferences for different 
types of schools, or because of school admission practices. Our analysis reveals that these 
concerns are only partly warranted. The intake composition of Labour academies in terms of 
pupils’ academic ability clearly improved more than for the Coalition academies. Nevertheless, 
we also found that ‘converter’ academies enrol fewer pupils with poor family backgrounds. 
Conversely, the intake of Coalition ‘sponsored’ academies has become somewhat more skewed 
towards disadvantaged children. This suggests that, at least along this dimension, schools are 
becoming more stratified.  
Although we are not yet able to tell whether this stems from parental free choice or school 
‘back door’ (hidden) selection practices, understanding the mechanisms that lie behind this 
finding is an essential future research venture of relevance for designing policies that can help 
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Figure 1: The changing profile of academies 
Note: The figures presents the mean academy percentile in the non-academy distribution in the school year prior to conversion for the 
characteristics in the headings of the plots (dots); mean percentile for the Labour years (short dash line); and mean percentile for the 
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Table 1: Number of academies over time – overall and by conversion type 
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 
Overall Converter Sponsored Overall Converter Sponsored 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 3 0 3 3 0 3 
2004 12 0 11 10 0 10 
2005 17 0 14 12 0 12 
2006 27 0 24 22 0 22 
2007 44 0 39 33 0 33 
2008 79 0 70 62 0 62 
2009 123 0 114 100 0 100 
2010 186 0 176 157 0 157 
2011 271 24 237 236 23 213 
2012 952 660 282 888 634 254 
2013 1360 1011 339 1278 970 308 
2014 1585 1148 429 1486 1090 396 
2015 1707 1209 493 1598 1139 459 
2016 1717 1212 500 1607 1141 466 
Note: Table reports number of academies opening in different years. The sample excludes two late openers and three predecessor schools that 
split into more than once academy each. Balanced panel only considers schools that are in the sample every year between 2002 and 2013. Data 
for the academic year 2015/2016 only refer to data available up to March 2015.  
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Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics – School level data 
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Academy 0.040 0.198 0.041 0.198 
KS4 Attainments [t-1] 315.2 45.93 316.6 45.11 
Proportion FSME [t-1] 0.157 0.128 0.154 0.128 
Proportion Male [t-1] 0.507 0.187 0.506 0.188 
Proportion White [t-1] 0.788 0.252 0.789 0.250 
KS2 Attainments [t-1] 63.63 7.254 63.84 7.219 
OFSTED Grade 1 [t-1] 0.211 0.408 0.217 0.413 
OFSTED Grade 2 [t-1] 0.438 0.496 0.442 0.497 
OFSTED Grade 3 [t-1] 0.301 0.459 0.294 0.456 
OFSTED Grade 4 [t-1] 0.050 0.218 0.046 0.210 
Community School [t-1] 0.575 0.494 0.574 0.494 
Voluntary Controlled School [t-1] 0.027 0.163 0.026 0.159 
Voluntary Aided School [t-1] 0.180 0.384 0.178 0.382 
Foundation School [t-1] 0.215 0.410 0.219 0.413 
City Technology College [t-1] 0.003 0.054 0.003 0.055 
Note: Number of observations: 29,474 in 2979 schools unbalanced panel; 27,933 in 2713 schools in balanced panel. Observations drop when 
considering OFSTED scores due to missing reports for the early years. Open is coded as zero for years in which schools are not academies; one 
for the first year in which the school becomes an academy; and missing for all years after the school has made a transition into academy. KS4 
point score is calculated across best eight subjects and includes GCSE equivalent; KS2 scores is calculated over English, Mathematics and 
Science.  
Table 2b: Descriptive Statistics – Pupil level data 
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
KS2 Attainments 65.69 16.93 67.78 16.90 
Pupil is FSME  0.144 0.351 0.144 0.351 
Pupil is Male  0.507 0.500 0.507 0.500 
Pupil is White  0.793 0.405 0.796 0.403 
Pupil in ‘Community’ predecessor 0.406 0.491 0.406 0.491 
Note: Number of observations: 1,994,809 (1,856,878 for KS2) pupils in 1529 schools in unbalanced panel; 1,925,391 (1,793,003for KS2) pupils 
in 1450 schools balanced panel. Sample include: observations up to 2013 for academies opened in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the time window [c-6, 
c+2] around opening date c (treated group) and observations up to 2013 for academies that will open in 2014, 2015 and 2016 in the time window 
[c-6, c-1] around opening date c (control group). KS2 scores is calculated over English, Mathematics and Science. 
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Table 3: ‘Predecessor’ characteristics and probability of conversion – 
unbalanced panel, Labour vs. Coalition Years 
Dependent variable is Pr[Becoming an academy at time t] 






























































































































































































Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Number of observations: 29,474 in 2979 
schools. KS4 point score is calculated across best eight subjects and includes GCSE equivalent; KS2 scores is calculated over English, 
Mathematics and Science. KS4 and KS2 point scores have been standardized. School type includes: community, foundation, voluntary aided and 
voluntary controlled. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better.  
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Table 4: ‘Predecessor’ characteristics and probability of conversion – 
balanced panel, Labour vs. Coalition Years
Dependent variable is Pr[Becoming an academy at time t] 






























































































































































































Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Number of observations: 27,933 in 2713 
schools. KS4 point score is calculated across best eight subjects and includes GCSE equivalent; KS2 scores is calculated over English, 
Mathematics and Science. KS4 and KS2 point scores have been standardized. School type includes: community, foundation, voluntary aided and 
voluntary controlled. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better.  
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Table 5: ‘Predecessor’ characteristics and probability of conversion – 
balanced panel, Further results
Dependent variable is Pr[Becoming an academy at time t] 
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Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. All regressions include predecessor school 
type dummies and LA dummies. Number of observations in Panel A: 24,302 in in 2698 schools. Number of observations in Panels B and C: 
27,933 in 2713. Discrepancies in the number of observations between panels are due to missing OFSTED inspection grades. KS4 point score is 
calculated across best eight subjects and includes GCSE equivalent. KS4 point scores have been standardized. OFSTED Grades as follows: 2 = 
Good; 3 = Requiring improvement; 4 = Inadequate. Omitted OFSTED Grade 1 (Outstanding). School type includes: community, foundation, 
voluntary aided and voluntary controlled. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better.  
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Table 6: Conversion and changes in school intake 











Panel A: Unbalanced panel, ‘Coalition’ years
Academy ×  









Panel B: Balanced panel; ‘Coalition’ years
Academy × 









Panel C: Balanced panel, timing analysis; ‘Coalition’ years
Academy × 















































































Panel D: Balanced panel; ‘Labour’ years
Academy × 









Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Number of observations in Panel A: 
1,994,809 (1,856,878 for KS2) pupils in 1529 schools. Number of observations in Panels B and C: 1,925,391 (1,793,003for KS2) pupils in 1450 
schools. Number of observations in Panel D: 340,414 (324,841 for KS2) pupils in 308 schools. Samples in Panels A, B and C include: 
observations up to 2013 for academies opened in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the time window [c-6, c+2] around opening date c (treated group) and 
observations up to 2013 for academies that will open in 2014, 2015 and 2016 in the time window [c-6, c-1] around opening date c (control 
group). Sample in Panel D includes: observations up to 2010 for academies opened between 2003 and 2010 in the time window [c-6, c+2] 
around opening date c (treated group) and observations up to 2010 for academies that will open in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the time window [c-6, 
c-1] around opening date c (control group). KS2 is calculated over English, Mathematics and Science and KS2 point scores have been 
standardized. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better.  
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Table 7: Conversion and changes in school intake – by conversion type 
Dependent variable is Std. KS2 Point Scores Pupil is FSME 




















































































Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Number of observations and sample constructions in Panels A and B: same as Panel B, Table 6. Number of observations and 
sample constructions in Panel C: same as Panel D, Table 6. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better. 
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Table 8: Conversion and changes in school intake – by conversion and predecessor type 

















































































Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Sample: balanced panel, ‘Coalition’ years. Number of observations: 781,125 (725,367 for KS2) pupils in 605 schools for 




Appendix Table 1: ‘Predecessor’ characteristics and probability of conversion – balanced panel 
Further results (no controls)
Dependent variable is Pr[Becoming an academy at time t] 
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Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Regressions include no additional controls. See 
Tables 2a and 5 for variable definitions and number of observations. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better.  
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Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Regressions consider only ‘Coalition’ years and 
schools in the balanced panel. Number of observations in Panel A: 2,127,609  (1,988,968 for KS2) pupils in 1450 schools in Panel A. Sample 
includes: observations up to 2013 for academies opened in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the time window [c-6, c+2] around opening date c (treated group) 
and observations between 2005 and 2013 for academies that will open in 2014, 2015 and 2016 (control group). The starting point of the control group 
observations (2005) coincides with c-6 from the opening year c of the first cohort of open (treated) academies. Number of observations in Panel B: 
1,613,712 (1,509,240 for KS2) pupils in 1130 schools. Sample includes: observations up to 2013 for academies opened in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the 
time window [c-6, c+2] around opening date c (treated group) and observations up to 2013 for academies that will open in 2016 only in the time 
window [c-6, c-1] around opening date c (control group). Number of observations in Panel C: 1,607,233 (1,503,361 for KS2) pupils in 1121 schools. 
Sample includes: only observations up to 2013 for academies opened in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the time window [c-6, c+2] around opening date c 
(treated group). Estimates of the conversion effect use variation in the timing of the roll out of conversions. KS2 is calculated over English, 
Mathematics and Science and KS2 point scores have been standardized. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better.  

































Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Sample: balanced panel, ‘Coalition’ years. 
Sample construction same as Panel B, Table 6. Number of observations: 781,125 (725,367 for KS2) pupils in 605 schools in Panel A; 1,144,266 
(1,067,636 for KS2) pupils in 845 schools in Panel B. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or better.  
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Appendix Table 4: Conversion and changes in school intake – by crossed conversion types 
Dependent 
variable is 



















































Note: Table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered at the school level in round parenthesis. Sample: balanced panel, ‘Coalition’ years. 
Number of observations and sample constructions: same as Panel B, Table 6. *: 10% significant; **: 5% significant or better; ***: 1% significant or 
better. 
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